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The goal of this Master’s Thesis was to study the risks a cloud service provider should be 
prepared to meet and perform a risk assessment for the case company’s proof of concept 
cloud where they act as the service provider. Due to security reasons, the study concen-
trates on the risk assessment process instead of the specific results, but the results are 
discussed on high level in order to evaluate the suitability of the selected methods for the 
cloud. 
 
This thesis was done in two parts. First the previous research on cloud security risks was 
studied and then the actual risk assessment done. Most of the previous research was made 
from the viewpoint of the cloud user instead of a provider, but in this study the reports are 
analysed to determine which of the risks apply also to the cloud provider. The risk assess-
ment performed in this study was qualitative and the framework from the ISO/IEC 
27005:2011 standard. STRIDE was selected as the threat modelling method. As a second-
ary plan for identifying the threats and vulnerabilities, a questionnaire with industry best 
practices was prepared. 
 
Two workshops were held with the case company during the risk assessment process. The 
first one concentrated on identifying the risks and the second on rating the risks. In the end 
STRIDE threat modelling was found to be challenging in a cloud environment and the sec-
ondary plan of identifying deviations from the industry best practises provided better results. 
Performing the risk assessment during the proof of concept phase limited the tools and data 
available, but the results were found to be valuable as a preparation for the production en-
vironment.  
 
Based on the risk assessment findings, the effect of the selected methods on the results 
were evaluated, a comparison of different threat modelling methods is presented here to-
gether with recommendations for future risk assessments. 
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1 Introduction 
The use of cloud environments has grown quite common and companies are moving 
more and more services to the cloud. The benefits of cloud - scalability and cost effec-
tiveness - are hard to ignore. However, cloud environments also bring many new chal-
lenges, many of them related to information security. One the biggest concern for com-
panies is the location of the data, which by legislation may have to be in the same country 
or at least in the same continent. This and also other factors related to security and 
privacy have lead companies to set up own their clouds. 
Any service exposed to the public is always vulnerable to attacks. Some outlines can be 
viewed in Verizon’s yearly Data Breach Investigations Report. The data for 2015 covers 
64199 security incidents of which 2260 lead to an actual data breach. Breach in this case 
means a confirmed exposure of data to an unauthorized party. The rest were incidents 
where the availability, confidentiality or integrity of data was potentially compromised. [1] 
The motives were mostly financial as seen in Figure 1, though it should be noted that the 
motives often overlap [1]. 
 
Figure 1. Motives behind breaches [1] 
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The report excluded thousands of cases with secondary motives where the attacker’s 
goal was to use the system to launch or support consequential attacks like denial of 
service (DoS) or hosting malware. If included, they would have outweighed the other 
motives [1]. With cloud based services, the trend can be expected to be the same. A 
public cloud is probably even more tempting target than a traditional server or s device, 
since it can be used to launch attacks towards other targets or at least to harness more 
resources.  
When assessing security risks it is not only the attacks that should be evaluated. The 
risks can be a result of misuse or human errors. The motive does not have to be mali-
cious either. Instead the risks can rise from flaws in operational procedures and usage, 
which brings a whole new spectrum of threats to consider. 
The goal of this study was to investigate the process of making a risk assessment and 
also evaluate the suitability of the selected methods for a cloud environment. However, 
the specific results of the risk assessment are out of the scope of this thesis due to con-
fidentiality reasons. 
The risk assessment was done for the case company on their proof of concept (PoC) 
cloud environment where they act as a cloud service provider. The PoC is a prototype 
system used to provide evidence that the implementation is feasible and the plan works. 
In this case the PoC cloud did not have all features of a production system, but it was a 
working cloud environment. The reason for performing the risk assessment at this phase, 
was to better prepare for the establishment of the production environment. When done 
already in PoC, the risks discovered could be taken into consideration when designing 
the final environment. Changes to the system would be much easier to implement before 
going to production. 
Groundwork for this study was done by examining the security risk listings provided by 
different cloud organizations and communities. The objective was to understand what 
kind of threats and risks are commonly seen in cloud environments. Most of the risk 
reports available were compiled from the viewpoint of the cloud users, but in this study 
they were examined in order to understand what the cloud provider should be prepared 
for. 
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The actual risk assessment was conducted during two workshops with the cloud pro-
vider. In the first workshop threats and vulnerabilities related to the system components 
were identified and deviations from recommended security controls were also looked at. 
In the second workshop the risks’ impacts and probabilities were evaluated from the 
viewpoint of the cloud provider. 
The report from the project is divided into six chapters. In Chapter 2 the basic concepts 
related to cloud and security risks are discussed. The chapter starts by presenting the 
terminology related to cloud and information security risk and continues introduce the 
methods selected for this study. Next, the different organizations related to the cloud 
along with previous research on the cloud security risks are examined. Finally, the chap-
ter provides conclusions on the findings. 
Chapter 3 briefly goes through the standards and recommendations related to infor-
mation technology security, whereas Chapter 4 is dedicated to the risk assessment pro-
cess. The risk assessment framework selected for this study is based on ISO/IEC 
270005 standard, but the chapter goes beyond the framework to briefly discuss the exact 
methods used in this project.  
In Chapter 5 the practical implementation of the risk assessment is described. It includes 
preparation and the two workshops held with the customer. In Chapter 6 the results of 
the assessment are discussed. Furthermore, the impacts of the selected methods on the 
results are evaluated. Finally, in Chapter 7 conclusions on the different methods are pre-
sented along with recommendations for future risk assessments. 
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2 Security Risks in Cloud 
This chapter goes through the concepts related to security risks in the cloud. First the 
terminology related to cloud is clarified and then the basics of information security risk 
are discussed. Finally previous research on cloud security risks is introduced. 
2.1 Definition of Cloud 
One of the most referred description of a cloud is by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST): 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand net-
work access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. [2] 
Before defining the different aspects of cloud more accurately, the terminology should 
be clarified. Firstly there is the cloud provider, which is the organization or entity main-
taining and owning the cloud hardware and resources. The second is the cloud con-
sumer, or user organization, who buys the resources or service from the cloud provider. 
The third term often used with a cloud is a tenant, which is essentially the same as a 
consumer but should not be mixed with one person as a user. Basically one environment 
inside the cloud system is referred to as a tenant. 
NIST lists five central characteristics that separate the cloud from other deployments [2]. 
 On-demand self-service: No human interaction with the cloud provider is 
required when the consumer needs to provision resources. 
 Broad network access: Offers availability over the network, but also usa-
bility for different kind of clients like tablets or laptops.  
 Resource pooling with multi-tenancy: Resources like storage or 
memory are pooled and assigned to different consumers as needed. 
 Rapid elasticity: The system can be scaled up or down, even automati-
cally, based on demand 
5 
  
 Measured service: The resources used can be measured in order to pro-
vide data to both consumer and provider. This data is often used as basis 
for Service Level Agreements (SLA) and billing. 
NIST’s definition is not the only one for cloud and the wording may slightly vary depend-
ing on a vendor or an organization, but usually they all share same characteristics where 
the cloud is a pool of resources which can be scaled dynamically without interaction with 
the service provider. A cloud uses virtualization techniques, but virtualization alone does 
not equal cloud. 
2.1.1 Cloud Deployment Models 
There are three deployment models available for a cloud: public, private and community. 
Some also list fourth, a hybrid, which is a combination of any of the three. The deploy-
ment model depends mainly on who the cloud consumers are.  
A public cloud, for example Amazon AWS or Microsoft Azure, is available for everyone. 
The computing resources are usually the largest in this deployment model and elasticity 
the highest. The communication towards the cloud is done via the public Internet and the 
hardware is located on the cloud provider’s premises [2].  
From the security point of view, the public cloud is the most attractive model to the at-
tackers, since the access is not limited for a certain group. A large consumer base means 
there’s more likely to be a malicious user included. Consequently, multi-tenancy and 
shared infrastructure pose additional risks with a public cloud. The resources used by an 
organization are separated only by policies implemented in the cloud provider’s software. 
Vulnerabilities or mistakes in the access controls or work procedures could potentially 
expose organization’s data to unauthorized party. [2][3] 
Public clouds can also introduce a problem with the location of the data. The consumer 
is not able to verify where the data is stored or how it is destroyed when no longer 
needed. This can cause legal issues in some cases. However, location can also be a 
benefit. A public cloud can offer services at a lower cost, since the datacenters can be 
built in places where either the costs for maintaining or establishing the infrastructure are 
cheaper. [2][3]  
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The second model, a private cloud, is used by a single company or organization. The 
owner and manager of the infrastructure can be the organization or an external party. In 
both cases the company must invest in the infrastructure, and have or buy the compe-
tence to maintain the cloud system. The hardware itself can be located either on or off 
premises, but it is not shared with other organizations. [2][4] 
Unlike with public cloud, the location of the data is not usually a concern with a private 
cloud. The organization knows and is able to verify where the data is physically stored. 
However, additional investments are required if the data has to be stored in geograph-
ically separated locations. Compared to public cloud, implementing geo-redundancy is 
much more expensive with a private cloud. In general, downside of a private cloud is that 
it will not have as large resources disposable as a public cloud and will not reach the 
same elasticity. [3] 
When thinking of security, a private cloud has the same security issues brought on by 
shared technologies. A malicious insider can do as much harm in this model as with a 
public cloud, though the attacker base is smaller. With private cloud the data might not 
end in the hands of a competitor, but for example financial data can be highly sensitive 
even if leaked inside organization. [2][3] 
The third option, a community cloud, is close to a private cloud, except it is shared by 
multiple organizations with similar interests and common goals. Usually the policies and 
requirements of the organizations involved in the community cloud are also compatible 
[3]. The benefits and downsides or the model are usually closer to a private than a public 
cloud, but the other consumers in the cloud are considered trusted [4]. 
From the security point of view, community cloud has a smaller attacker base than a 
public cloud, but the same risks with multi-tenancy exist apply to all deployment models. 
Whether the community cloud is located on one of the organizations’ premises or out-
sourced, the other consumers must access the system either via public Internet or a 
leased line. This rises some extra security concerns compared to private cloud which 
could be on-premises for the organization. [3] 
The last model is a hybrid cloud which can be any combination of a public, private and 
community cloud. The clouds are their own entities, but they are connected by technol-
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ogy that allows data portability. The benefits and security issues will depend on the com-
bination chosen, but the resulting cloud system can be complex to map or characterize. 
[3] 
2.1.2 Cloud Service Models 
Besides the different deployments models, a cloud also has three service models that 
define what kind of services the cloud consumer uses from the provider. The models are 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Ser-
vice (SaaS). 
The first, Infrastructure as a Service, offers only infrastructure. Two examples of IaaS 
providers are Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure though both offer also other service 
models. With IaaS the cloud consumer does not purchase physical servers, networking 
or storage devices, but instead buys them as a virtualized resources from the cloud pro-
vider [4]. With IaaS user can choose from a selection of storage options and has control 
over the operating system (OS), but they have no access to the hardware. Figure 2 dis-
plays how the control is divided between the provider and the consumer. 
 
Figure 2. Scope of control in IaaS by NIST [3] 
As seen in Figure 2, the consumer is able to make requests towards the hardware via a 
hypervisor layer. Simplified, the hypervisor is software that uses hardware to produce 
virtual machines (VMs). From the consumer point of view they can access the VM very 
similarly to having a physical machine. They can configure and power the machine on or 
off and even modify the network, but in the background it is the hypervisor that handles 
all the actions. The hypervisor layer takes care and polices that required resources are 
available before executing any actions. [3] 
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Compared to other service models, the consumers have the most control over the envi-
ronment with IaaS. Consequently they also have to take greater responsibility of the se-
curity controls implemented. Everything above the hypervisor layer is handled by the 
consumer, meaning also updates and security configurations for the OS have to be ad-
ministrated by the consumer. [3]  
The layers might not always be as strict as displayed in Figure 2, but it gives a good 
overview. For example, the cloud provider may only offer a selection of operating sys-
tems and the consumer can have some interfaces to the storage or networking but not 
full control of either. 
The second model is Platform as a Service (PaaS), where the user does not have control 
over the OS or the underlying infrastructure. The consumer is not able to create virtual 
machines. Instead only a platform with specific, predefined tools is offered, usually for 
software development [3]. An example of PaaS provider is Google App Engine, but also 
Microsoft Azure and Amazon AWS can be used as PaaS. Figure 3 shows how the control 
is divided between provider and consumer in PaaS. 
 
Figure 3. Scope of control in PaaS by NIST [3] 
As seen in Figure 3, the provider only offers programming interfaces towards the mid-
dleware for the consumer, who then uses them to build an application. Basically the 
consumer can develop and host a web application without having to invest in the physical 
infrastructure. The consumer may have the possibility of affecting configuration settings 
on the platform in some cases, but all layers below are handled by the provider [2] [3].  
One of the benefits for the consumer is cost-savings, since there is no need to build a 
whole infrastructure for the development. It can also be practical for students or people 
learning software development. In a larger scale, the problems related to platform are 
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also migrated to the provider and the consumer does not have to worry about the scala-
bility. The billing models may vary depending on the consumer, but in large cloud envi-
ronments the costs are fairly low. Usually the fees are based on resources consumed or 
a used platform time [3].  
The last option is Software as a Service (SaaS). With SaaS the application, for example 
an email, is hosted in the cloud and a web interface to it is offered. The consumer is not 
able to make changes to the application, except maybe some small configuration set-
tings. In this model, the user does not have access to any operating system or even a 
platform [2] [3]. One of the most known SaaS solutions is Salesforce Customer Relation-
ship Management (CRM). 
The benefits of SaaS are largely the same as for PaaS. The consumer does not have to 
worry about scalability, infrastructure or management of the application. As a downside, 
the security in this case is also out of the hands of the consumer. The consumer must 
be able to trust that the security of the provider is sufficient for the use. [3] 
In this study the case cloud being evaluated is offering Infrastructure as a Service. In the 
future, the company will also offer PaaS and SaaS, but at the time of the thesis, these 
features were still being developed. 
2.2 Information Security Risk 
The risks and benefits of cloud models were already briefly mentioned in the previous 
sections, but before going into the details, the concept of information security risk is dis-
cussed. The importance of understanding the information security risks rises from the 
fact that it is not possible to make a system or service completely secure while maintain-
ing usability. The purpose of identifying the risks does not necessarily mean preventing 
the security incidents from happening. In some cases the costs of preventing an incident 
may be higher than the value lost in the actual event. Investigating the risks makes it 
possible to choose the most cost-efficient option between accepting, mitigating or trying 
to avoid a risk. 
Typically an information security risk refers to the possibility that the confidentiality, in-
tegrity or availability of the information system is compromised. In the simplest form risk 
is defined as:  
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Risk = Likelihood * Impact 
The likelihood in the formula indicates how probable the security incident is and the im-
pact represents the effects of the incident to the organization. [5] [6] 
Information security risk cannot be discussed without the concepts of threat and vulner-
ability. ISO/IEC 27000:2012 standard defines threat as “a potential cause of an unwanted 
incident, which may result in harm to a system or organisation”. Vulnerability on the other 
hand is defined as “a weakness of an asset or control that can be exploited by one or 
more threats” [7]. The relation between threat, vulnerability and risk is displayed in Figure 
4. 
 
Figure 4. Risk model with key risk factors [5] 
Risks emerge when there is a possibility that a threat will exploit a vulnerability and cause 
harm to the organization [7]. The likelihood in the risk formula presents itself twice in the 
risk model. Firstly, there must be a likelihood that the threat source initiates the threat 
event either accidentally or on purpose. It requires that there are means and in some 
cases motive. Secondly, there is the likelihood of success for the exploit. This is affected 
by, not only the vulnerability, but the predisposing conditions and security controls of the 
system. For example, a geographical location is a predisposing condition if considering 
a risk for an earth quake, whereas weak structures can be a vulnerability. If the threat 
has a probability for successfully exploiting the vulnerability, the resulting impact together 
with the likelihood produce the risk. [5] 
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The evaluation of impact and probability and their relation to a risk assessment process 
will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 4, but as seen from the risk model, there is 
no risk without a threat or a vulnerability. Therefore, one of the key factors in handling 
information security risks is understanding the threats. The following two sections briefly 
introduce strategies for finding the threats. 
2.2.1 STRIDE Threat Modelling 
STRIDE is a threat model by Microsoft, published in 1999 by Loren Kohnfelder and 
Praerit Garg. The acronym is derived from the following words: spoofing, tampering, re-
pudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege. The terms 
are the opposites of security properties which all systems attempt to implement: authen-
tication, integrity, non-repudiation, confidentiality, availability and authorization. [8].  
The STRIDE model reminds to think about those six threats when investigating what can 
go wrong in the system. It is not important which category each threat belongs to, instead 
the purpose is to offer ideas for locating the threats. Hence, the different angles can be 
applied to multiple situations. They can be used when examining network, system or 
even operative functions. 
The first term, spoofing, refers to pretending to be someone or something and it is the 
opposite of authentication. In the simplest form it can be calling a person and pretending 
to be from help desk. Spoofing is one of the most common threats that appear in social 
contexts, but it applies to technical systems equally. For example, it can be a program 
that is named to look like something else or a forged DNS entry that takes the user to a 
malicious web page when trying to access a bank’s site. [8] 
The second term, tampering, means modifying information or a system without permis-
sion. Examples are manipulation of HTTP headers or network traffic. However, it could 
also mean editing a customer database or a system configuration file. In those cases 
integrity of the system is being compromised and the information can no longer be guar-
anteed to be accurate or complete. [8][9] 
The third threat, repudiation, takes place when something is done and there is no way to 
prove it happened. It is the opposite of security property called non-repudiation. For ex-
ample, signing a document is a proof of non-repudiation, meaning that one cannot deny 
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they have read it. In information technology repudiation is usually associated with log-
ging. Consequently, saving logs outside a system makes it harder for the attacker to hide 
their tracks by modifying or erasing the logs. [8][9] 
The fourth in the list, information disclosure, is a breach of confidentiality where infor-
mation is being seen by a party that should not have any access to it. Eavesdropping a 
network communication is one example of information disclosure. Similar effect can be 
the result of having incorrect permissions on a file [8]. In the cloud world information 
disclosure is one of the biggest concerns for the cloud consumers. When a user uploads 
their data to the cloud, there has to be sufficient safeguards to preserve the confidentiality 
of the information during transfer and also in storage. 
Another important factor with cloud environments is availability. If the consumer is run-
ning applications or other business critical systems in the cloud, it is vital that the service 
is always accessible. Denial of service threats jeopardize that. The threat is often asso-
ciated with network attacks, where the bandwidth of a server or a link is exhausted, but 
it can also mean overprovisioning system resources like CPU or memory until the system 
becomes unusable [8]. Another cloud-related example is overflowing an application pro-
gramming interface (API) hosted in a cloud. If the cloud resource is being changed based 
on API calls, such attack could exhaust the credit limit assigned for the system. 
The last term, elevation of privilege, happens when normal user is able to perform ad-
ministrative actions that they should not be able to execute. The entity does not have to 
be a user, instead it could also be a process. In the programming context, this can hap-
pen if the authorization checks are not sufficient. Consequently, the threat is considered 
to be the opposite of authorization. [8][9] 
However, the borders of each category are not always clear. Repudiation can happen 
via tampering of data or information disclosure by spoofing. When modelling threats it is 
not important that the right category is chosen. The main point is that the threats are 
found and listed. Similarly, probability of the threat is not a concern at this stage. The 
likelihood of the event will be evaluated in a different stage of risk assessment. 
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2.2.2 Attack Libraries 
Another method of discovering threats are attack libraries. Attack libraries are prebuilt 
collections that include descriptions about cyber-attack patterns. Patterns in this case 
means detailed technical explanations about the attacks. As opposed to STRIDE, attack 
libraries are not high level or abstract, instead they have practical examples of attacks 
that have been done it the past. [8] [10] 
One of the largest attack libraries is MITRE’s Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification (CAPEC). The library was originally established by U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security in 2007, but nowadays it is being updated by public participation. The 
most recent version 2.8 released in December 7 2015 included 504 different attack pat-
terns. [10] 
CAPEC list is very detailed and it can be browsed online or downloaded in XML format. 
The information on each attack contains summary, attack prerequisites, typical severity, 
likelihood, attacker skill required, resources required, mitigations, related weaknesses 
and many other factors related to the attack. The security controls against the attack are 
also well described. [8][10] 
The CAPEC library can be searched with keywords, for example “SQL”, or by IDs, but it 
is also organized in domains of attack and mechanisms of attack. The domains are social 
engineering, supply chain, communications, software, physical security and hardware. 
For mechanisms of attack there are 17 different categories [10]: 
 gather information  
 deplete resources  
 injection 
 deceptive interactions 
 manipulate timing and state 
 abuse of functionality  
 probabilistic techniques 
 exploitation of authentication  
 exploitation of authorization  
 manipulate data structures 
 manipulate resources  
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 analyse target  
 physical access 
 execute code  
 alter system components  
 manipulate system users. 
The challenge in using CAPEC is the extent of the library. It can be time consuming to 
go through the whole library if not already familiar with most of the content. Other element 
to consider is the precision of the patterns. For a less experienced security practitioner 
the exact details offered by CAPEC can be very helpful. For more experienced profes-
sional, the library can also be a limiting factor compared to STRIDE which only offers 
high level guidance. [8] 
In addition to the attack library MITRE also offers similar database for vulnerabilities. The 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a list of publicly known cybersecurity 
weaknesses. Similarly to CAPEC, it can be searched with IDs or with keywords. CVE 
includes over 300 products and services and therefore the keywords used can even be 
product or component names. The database is used by many vulnerability scanners in 
order to provide a common lexicon.  [11] 
2.3 Previous Research on Cloud Security Risks 
As cloud services have become more common, studies have been conducted specifically 
on cloud security risks. The risks vary greatly depending on what kind of services are 
being hosted and therefore it is difficult to give a comprehensive list that would cover all 
use cases. However, there are certain organizations that have collected information 
about risks commonly seen in cloud environments and ranked them accordingly. These 
listings give a good overview of what kind of issues the cloud service users, and conse-
quently also cloud service provider, should be prepared to meet. These five listings are 
introduced in the following sections. 
2.3.1 CSA - The Treacherous 12 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is a non-profit organization established in 2009. They are 
dedicated explicitly for cloud security. The organization has many large corporate mem-
bers, such as Microsoft, VMware and EMC, as well as individuals. It provides research, 
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conferences and also certifications related to the field. It is responsible for a CSA Secu-
rity, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR), which is a notable certification in cloud security. 
[12] 
In February 2016 CSA released a report sponsored by Hewlett-Packard that lists the top 
12 threats in the cloud. From the five different cloud security reports introduced here, this 
is the most recent. The study was conducted by first selecting 20 issues and then re-
questing each working group member to rate their importance to their organization. 
About 270 respondents took part in the survey. [13] 
The results from CSA’s report include a description of the risk, a list of the cloud service 
models that it applies to and a reference to security guidance for each risk. The report 
also specifies which STRIDE threat category the risk is associated with and offers links 
to articles with information on similar previous attacks. Therefore the information offered 
by CSA’s report can be directly associated with real-world incidents. [13] 
Table 1 lists and describes the risks ranked according to severity as seen by the organ-
izations [13]. 
Table 1. The Treacherous 12 - CSA’s Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2016 
Risk [13] Description [13] 
1. Data breaches Confidentiality of data is compromised  
2. Insufficient Identity, Credential 
and Access Management 
Insufficient or ineffective authentication methods. Risk 
that credentials or cryptographic keys are exposed 
3. Insecure Interfaces and APIs Cloud UIs or APIs are not protected well enough 
4. System Vulnerabilities Confidentiality, integrity or availability or the system is 
compromised due to other tenants, system vulnerabili-
ties or insufficient logging 
5. Account Hijacking Cloud account stolen or hijacked. Company reputation 
and data compromised 
6. Malicious Insiders Insider in the cloud compromises the data, either inten-
tionally or due to negligence 
7. Advanced Persistent Threats Risk of organized, technically advanced attackers target-
ing the system, for example government entity 
8. Data loss The data stored in cloud is lost, not just compromised 
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9. Insufficient Due Diligence All consequences of moving a service or data to the cloud 
are not understood and the cloud provider processes do 
not match the needs or the organization 
10. Abuse and Nefarious Use of 
Cloud Services 
Risk that the cloud service is used for malicious purposes, 
e.g.to launch attacks or to exhaust the cloud’s resources   
11. Denial of Service Loss of availability due to denial service attack towards 
the cloud 
12. Shared Technology 
Vulnerabilities 
Risk that the isolation of tenants is not sufficient in the 
cloud. Fear that the shared resources, e.g. hypervisor is 
breached 
Most of the risks listed in Table 1 apply to both cloud provider and consumer. According 
to the report, the risks can be seen in all service models, hence the top risks are the 
same for IaaS, PaaS and SaaS environments. 
Even though the greatest risk, data breach is listed as a separate risk, most of the other 
risks are also related to information getting disclosed to an unauthorized party. Only the 
risks associated with nefarious use of cloud services, denial of service and data loss do 
not threaten the confidentiality of the data. With complete data loss, confidentiality is no 
longer an issue since the information is lost for everyone involved. [13] 
When examining the risks from the cloud provider’s perspective, it is not only the cloud 
consumer’s data that can be compromised. The provider also has their own system and 
billing data that needs to be protected. Similarly, insecure APIs or UIs can compromise 
the whole cloud and not just a specific client. Even if the risk would impact a single tenant, 
the reputation of the cloud provider would suffer in the event of an incident. Therefore 
there are no risks that cloud be defined as consumer’s responsibility alone. 
In addition to confidentiality, another important factor for the cloud provider is the availa-
bility of the system. The whole concept of cloud service relies on the fact that the provider 
can offer near constant uptime for the system. Besides traditional denial of service, also 
system vulnerabilities, data loss and abuse of cloud services put the availability of the 
system at risk. Less obvious risks that compromise availability are insufficient identity 
and access management as well as account hijacking [13]. In cases where it is the pro-
vider’s own credentials that have been exposed, the result can be catastrophic for the 
whole cloud infrastructure. The damage that can be done to a system with administrative 
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credentials is extensive, not to mention the time or cost used to changing all compro-
mised credentials. 
Regardless of the direct effect on the provider, it is in their interests to offer safeguards 
against all of the risks listed. However, depending on the service model, it can be up to 
the consumer whether they implement the security controls or not. Only the risk related 
to due diligence can be difficult for the provider to cover, since it greatly depends on the 
service or data that the consumer will transfer to the cloud. Fully understanding this risk 
is therefore the responsibility of the cloud consumer. Nevertheless, the provider should 
try to offer security controls that enable the consumer to fulfil the legal obligations they 
have.  
2.3.2 ENISA – Cloud Computing Benefits, Risks and Recommendations for Infor-
mation Security 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is EU funded 
agency working in the field of network and information security. Established in 2004, they 
make recommendations and host events that concern European Union’s laws and poli-
cies about information security. [14] 
In 2009 ENISA released a risk assessment related to cloud computing. The assessment 
was done in co-operation with government organizations, academic parties and industry. 
The assessment includes 35 risks identified and also recommendations related to the 
cloud and is therefore the most comprehensive one. [15] 
Table 2 lists the eight most important risks found in the report. These risks are not in any 
order of importance. The full list can be found in Appendix 1. 
Table 2. Cloud computing risks by ENISA 
Risk [15] Description [15] 
Loss of governance Cloud consumer loses control of many aspects related 
to security 
Lock-in Risk that once data is stored in cloud, it is not feasible to 
transfer it back. Consumer is locked in with one provider. 
Isolation failure Shared resources and other tenants compromise the 
user’s system 
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Compliance risks Cloud provider can’t prove compliance to certain require-
ments and the audit possibilities by the customer are 
limited 
Management interface compro-
mise 
The management interface provided by the cloud is not 
secured sufficiently 
Data protection The security of the data is compromised either during 
storage or transit 
Insecure or incomplete data de-
letion 
The data deletion is not complete since it may not be pos-
sible to effectively wipe the disks due to sharing 
Malicious insider Malicious insider in the cloud provider can compromise 
the data or system 
Although the risks listed in Table 2 were identified in 2009, many still correspond to the 
risks identified by CSA in 2016. The risk with compliance and loss of governance can be 
covered with CSA’s risk related to due diligence, however, incomplete data deletion is 
not on CSA’s list. Likewise, the risk of lock-in with a certain provider is no longer seen as 
a top risk. This is probably because presently there are more cloud providers to choose 
from, and therefore it is possible to select one that can guarantee that the customer is 
able to reclaim their data if needed. The decision to migrate to cloud is typically not taken 
lightly and consequently the major concern with data lock-in is how to recover the data 
in case the provider goes bankrupt instead of planning for possible provider change in 
advance. 
However, ENISA’s risks listed in Table 2, are the cloud-specific top eight. In addition, the 
complete listing includes eleven risks that also apply to traditional IT environments and 
those were not rated against the top eight. These risks are [15]: 
 network breaks 
 network management (network congestion, misconnection, non-optimal use) 
 modifying network traffic 
 privilege escalation 
 social engineering attacks 
 loss or compromise of operational logs 
 loss or compromise of security logs 
 backups lost or stolen 
 unauthorized access to premises 
 theft of computer equipment 
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 natural disasters. 
The impacts of these risks can be considered to be higher in cloud than in traditional 
systems, at least for the cloud provider. From the provider’s perspective some of the 
cloud-specific risks are in fact less important than these. Loss of governance, data lock-
in and incomplete data deletion are risks that the cloud consumer must evaluate. The 
provider can, in some cases, address these risks on certain level in their service level 
agreements (SLAs), but transferring these risk completely to the provider is usually not 
possible. Likewise, risks related to compliance depend on the information stored and 
usage of the cloud. The cloud provider may not get the customer if they cannot fulfil the 
requirements, but for example payment card industry (PCI) regulations will be extremely 
difficult to satisfy. Even attempting to meet such a risk is not worth the investment. 
2.3.3 NIST - Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S government controlled 
agency, released a Special Publication 800-146 “Cloud Computing Synopsis and Rec-
ommendations” in 2012. The guideline is directed for Federals agencies, but NIST’s rec-
ommendations are followed by many commercial organizations. The document intro-
duces the benefits and issues associated with cloud environments and also gives rec-
ommendations for best practices. The publication discusses IaaS, SaaS and PaaS mod-
els in separate chapters, giving distinct observations on each. [3] 
Even though NIST SP 800-146 is not a risk listing similar to the ones introduced earlier, 
the issues raised in the document can be translated to risks. As this study focuses on 
IaaS, the issues introduced in Table 3 describe the risks found with that service model. 
[3] 
Table 3. Risks related to IaaS cloud  
Issue (risk) [3] Description [3] 
Network dependence Risk that availability of the system is not high enough 
since public Internet is used for the connection 
Browser-based risks Customer’s contaminated browser compromises the 
whole system or the communication is not secure 
enough 
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Compatibility with legacy secu-
rity vulnerabilities 
Legacy software run in the cloud by a consumer com-
promises security 
Virtual machine sprawl Inactive VM’s software is not updated accordingly and 
compromises system security 
Verifying authenticity of an IaaS 
cloud provider web site 
Risk that the cloud provider web site’s identity is not vali-
dated and instead connection to impostor is established 
Robustness of VM-level isolation Risk that the virtual environments are not isolated 
properly. Malicious tenants could have access 
Features for dynamic network 
configuration for providing isola-
tion 
Risk that the networks of each tenant are not isolated 
completely 
Data erase practices Data deleted is not completely wiped. Backup policies 
and replication may also complicate deletion 
The risks listed in Table 3 are somewhat more definitive than the ones found in the other 
listings, but they address similar concerns. As the list is directed at the cloud consumers, 
there are issues that the provider cannot address. From the cloud provider’s perspective, 
most of the risks that apply are related to multi-tenancy and shared technologies. Out-
dated virtual machines and isolation of machines and networks all fall under that cate-
gory. In addition, risks to service availability the provider must typically address, since 
availability is one of the main benefits offered by the cloud. 
Unlike the other studies, NIST SP 800-146 also discusses the promises and limitations 
of cloud provider policies. Typically the providers promise availability that is above 99.5% 
and offer a refund if the availability is not reached. However, the refund covers only the 
service fees and not the potential lost business value. Furthermore, it is the customer’s 
responsibility to report about the outage they experienced. [3] 
Depending on the provider, policies also include clauses about the preservation of data. 
Some providers promise to save the data for approximately one month after the con-
sumer has stopped using the cloud, but others recommend backing up the data either 
locally or to another provider. Most providers reserve the right to resign that obligation if 
the consumer violates the provider’s acceptable use policies. [3] 
Usually cloud providers also guarantee that the customer data is not handed out to any-
one without legal request. However, many service agreements state that the provider is 
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not responsible for security breaches or service interruptions caused by malicious activ-
ity. Instead the security risks are often placed on the consumer [3]. Nevertheless, that 
does not mean that the provider should not address the risks related to security. It only 
means that the provider cannot understand the risks related to each consumer’s specific 
service and therefore the customer should evaluate those themselves. 
2.3.4 OWASP – Cloud Top 10 Security Risks 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a non-profit, international or-
ganization established in 2001. Their mission is to collect and share information on soft-
ware security in web applications. They are vendor and product independent while pro-
moting the use of standards. [16] 
One of the projects of OWASP is “Cloud Top 10 Security Risks”, which lists and ranks 
risks commonly seen in public and hybrid clouds. The list is collected based on input 
from security professionals and reports from cloud providers. The listing is targeted for 
companies hosting services in the cloud but also for cloud service providers. [17]  
OWASP’s ranking is the least formal reference used in this study, as it is yet to be up-
dated beyond pre-alpha release. The first draft was published in 2009 and it has never 
reached full maturity [17]. However, there are not many publicly available cloud-specific 
studies and OWASP has a history of producing high quality security guidelines. Most 
notable listing being “OWASP Top 10” dedicated for web application security risks. The 
web application listing is quoted by many books and organizations, providing reference 
for OWASP’s competence in the security field. Therefore the “Cloud Top 10 Security 
Risks” report (see Table 4) was deemed to be reliable enough to be compared with other 
similar studies. 
Table 4. OWASP – Cloud top 10 security risks 
Risk [17] Description [17] 
1.  Accountability and data owner-
ship 
Control over the data is lost. Risks related to manage-
ment of backups, storage location, data deletion  
2. User identity federation Risk of user identity management getting too compli-
cated. Federated identity should be usable over cloud 
providers 
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3. Regulatory compliance If cloud does not adhere to the same regulations or poli-
cies as the organization regulatory compliance is lost. 
4. Business continuity and resili-
ency 
Responsibility of the business continuity gets transferred 
to cloud provider. Risk that the business continuity plans 
do not meet requirements 
5. User privacy and secondary us-
age of data 
User’s privacy is violated. Secondary usage of data, for 
example based on behaviour or clicks, could be allowed 
6. Service and data integration Loss of confidentiality during data transfer. The data-in-
transit between the customer to the cloud provider should 
be encrypted 
7. Multi-tenancy and physical se-
curity 
Risk that another tenant in the cloud compromises the 
confidentiality, integrity of availability of the user’s data 
8. Incidence analysis and forensic 
support 
Logging by the cloud provider is not sufficient in the 
events of security incident. The logs of multiple customers 
may reside in same hardware and therefore be included 
in investigations 
9. Infrastructure security Cloud provider systems and networks are not configured 
according to best practices 
10. Non production environment 
exposure 
Risk that the user’s non-production environment is not 
configured according to security policies due to not being 
in official production 
The risks listed in Table 4 include many of the same concerns as the listings earlier. For 
the provider accountability and data ownership may not seem directly applicable, but 
securing the provider’s own configuration and billing data is their responsibility alone. 
Regulatory compliance as well as secondary usage of data, are not risks that the provider 
should be prepared to evaluate. Nevertheless, offering sufficient and reliable identity 
management is the basis for billing and also an important component in tenant isolation. 
Whether or not the identity federation conforms to the consumer’s requirements is a fac-
tor when the service contract is signed, but not an actual risk. 
The most notable difference with other listings is the inclusion of non-production environ-
ment exposure. However, the provider’s system should be designed in a way that a sin-
gle compromised tenant would not endanger the whole cloud. Therefore the threats re-
lated to this risk are already included in the infrastructure security if viewed from the 
provider’s perspective. 
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2.3.5 Conclusions from Risk Listings 
The risk listings provided by the four different organizations share many similar issues. 
This section compares the reports. The risks were grouped according to the most recent 
study by CSA. 
Certain risks were removed from the composite list, because they can only be evaluated 
by the cloud consumer. Those risks require in-depth knowledge on the consumer’s ser-
vices, or in some cases understanding on a field-specific legislation, and therefore they 
cannot be included in any general risk assessment by the provider. Such differences 
between the responsibilities of the provider and consumer were discussed in the previ-
ous sections. The results of the comparison are displayed in Table 5.  
Table 5. Composite of risks listings 
It is noteworthy that the four risk studies only included top ranked risks, meaning that the 
complete lists of risks found in by each analysis could overlap even more. Since such 
Risk 
CSA [13] 
OWASP 
[17] 
ENISA 
[15] 
NIST [3] 
Shared technology vulnerabilities yes yes yes yes 
System vulnerabilities yes yes yes yes 
Data breaches yes yes yes (yes) 
Denial of service yes (yes) yes (yes) 
Data loss yes yes yes (yes) 
Insecure interfaces and APIs yes  yes yes 
Insufficient identity, credential 
and access management 
yes yes yes  
Account hijacking yes  yes (yes) 
Malicious insiders yes  yes  
Incidence analysis and forensic support  yes yes  
Abuse and nefarious use of 
cloud services 
yes  (yes)  
Advanced persistent threats yes    
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data is not publicly available, this comparison will give an overview of what is seen as 
most critical. However, as ENISA provided a list of 35 risks in addition to the top eight, 
the full list was used in that case. 
In the Table 5, it can be seen that the risk related to shared technologies, or tenant 
isolation, is ranked highest. The risk is distinct for the cloud and consequently it is no 
surprise all studies included it. The existence of this risk does not depend on the deploy-
ment model or even service model of the cloud. Therefore all cloud providers must eval-
uate and use the necessary security controls to lower the probability of the risk.  
Closely related to the same issue are system vulnerabilities. However, as opposed to 
the shared technologies, this risk is more general. The object of system vulnerabilities is 
the same libraries and applications that are used in traditional IT environments. As an 
example, every regular web or email server must address the risks related to these vul-
nerabilities regardless of being hosted in cloud or not. 
All of the studies also mention data breach and complete loss of data in one form or 
another. In NIST SP 800-146 neither is directly listed as an issue, but the publication 
includes recommendations for analyzing the data protection mechanisms before com-
mitting to any provider. 
The last risk that can be said to be included in all studies is denial of service. The risk 
compromises the availability of the service and in that form it can be seen in all four 
reports. OWASP’s ranking does not directly address the risk, but the risk related to multi-
tenancy covers scenarios where other tenants jeopardize the availability of the system 
by consuming excessive resources and effectively creating denial of service situation. 
The risk differentiates from NIST’s risk definition where the availability is compromised 
due to to public Internet, whereas studies by ENISA and CSA include both cases as 
separate risks. However, since availability is one of the key benefits of cloud, denial of 
service risks must be taken seriously regardless if they happen in the network or inside 
the cloud system. Hence the risk is seen as a separate issue in the composite list. 
Three of the four reports include risks related to the security of the cloud interfaces and 
identity management. These risks the cloud provider will also have to address. Account 
hijacking is also mentioned on certain level in three reports. NIST SP 800-146 lists this 
risk in the form of consumer having to validate the authenticity of the cloud provider’s 
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web page. If they access an impostor instead, there is a possibility of compromised cre-
dentials. 
One risk that is not included in the composite list, due to being mainly the concern of the 
consumer, is incomplete data deletion. Three of the four studies listed this risk in their 
analysis. However, there is practically no way the cloud provider can guarantee complete 
erasure of data, since the physical disks are shared by multiple consumers. At most, this 
can be addressed in the cloud provider’s policies. 
Lastly, there is a risk that was only included in two of the studies, but which is important 
for the cloud provider. Malicious use of cloud resources appears on CSA’s report, and in 
a way in ENISA’s. ENISA lists the risk from the consumer’s perspective as loss of repu-
tation due to co-tenant activities. However, the threat in both cases covers situations 
where the cloud is used to launch attacks to the outside world. For the provider that has 
a negative effect on their reputation, but it also consumes cloud resources. Furthermore, 
the attacks can result in organizations or service providers blocking the cloud provider’s 
IP address range, thus making the cloud services unusable. 
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3 Information Security Controls 
 
As introduced in the previous section there are a multitude of risks that the cloud provider 
must be prepared to meet. Section 2.2 introduced the key factors in risk models where 
the probability of a successful exploit is affected by both the vulnerabilities and security 
controls in the system. Securing an IT environment is not a simple task, but there are 
many guidelines that can be followed. Different organizations offer best practices and 
procedures that help with security. Understanding the security controls also helps to un-
derstand the vulnerabilities and risks in the system. The controls may not all be applica-
ble directly to a cloud, where machines and services are regularly deployed and deleted, 
but most of the practices still hold. 
3.1 ISO/IEC 27001:2013  
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 is an international standard published by International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in 
2013. The standard lists requirements for Information Security Management System 
(ISMS), which is used to analyse and address the risks in an organization. It is a formal 
specification and does not offer specific controls. The standard defines processes for 
leadership, planning, support, operation, performance evaluation and improvement of 
the ISMS. It does not detail specific methods which organizations should use to accom-
plish the requirements. [18] 
Since the standard does not offer any specific controls, the details are not introduced 
here. The relevance with this study comes from the requirements for performing contin-
uous risk assessments and therefore confirms the need for this assessment. 
3.2 ISO/IEC 27002:2013 
ISO/IEC 27002:2013 is another international standard updated in 2013. The standard 
has a history of 30 years and it has been updated regularly during that time. It is dedi-
cated to information security in a broad scope, including intellectual property and 
knowledge, not just computer data. Unlike ISO/IEC 27001, this standard defines a set of 
specific security controls that should be applied. ISO/IEC 27002 covers the following 14 
sections [19]: 
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 information security policies 
 organization of information security 
 human resource security 
 asset management 
 access control 
 cryptography 
 physical and environmental security 
 operations security 
 communications security 
 system acquisition, development and maintenance 
 supplier relationships 
 information security incident management 
 information security aspects of business continuity management 
 compliance. 
Under each of the topic there is a list of detailed controls, totaling in 114. The controls 
are specific, but do not dictate the technologies or exact methods used to implement 
each control. It instructs for example to perform event logging, protect against malware 
and segregate networks [19]. All those and many more can be directly applied to the 
cloud. Neglecting to implement the controls will result in increased risks to the system. 
Therefore knowing this standard will also help in evaluating the risks. 
3.3 CIS Critical Security Controls 
Center for Internet Security (CIS) is a U.S non-profit organization established in 2000. 
The mission of the organization is to identify and provide best practices in cyber security 
for both the public and private sector. The organization is an internationally recognized 
source for best practices, benchmarks and metrics. [20] [21] 
CIS had produced a document “The CIS Critical Security Controls”, which gives guide-
lines on how to prevent the most common and dangerous attacks. Input for the recom-
mendations comes from organizations that are familiar with cyber-attacks, for example 
U.S law enforcement and top incident response teams including NSA’s Red Team [20]. 
The guideline was also recently approved and published as a suite of technical reports 
by European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [22]. 
28 
  
The document includes 20 critical security controls with multiple, detailed control actions 
under each clause. Some of the controls are purely technical and some also procedural. 
The controls are listed according to importance, and the reasoning behind each control 
is explained. The order is adjusted between versions and new entries added when nec-
essary. The purpose of the list is to distinguish the most important controls from the large 
amount of security guidance available. The practical experience of the contributing enti-
ties ensures that the selected controls are the ones that have been proved to work. The 
guideline is meant to not only prevent, but also help detecting and restricting ongoing 
attacks. [23] 
The current version of CIS Critical Security Controls is 6.1, released on Aug 31 2016. 
However, the risk assessment done in this study used version 6.0, since it was the latest 
at the time of the actual assessment. 
3.4 Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing 
Document “Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing” is pub-
lished by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) and unlike the two previous recommendations, 
it is specific for cloud. The most recent revision 3.0 was released in 2014.  
The guideline is roughly divided into two topics: governance and operations. Governance 
part handles the issues concerning policies and legal issues, whereas operations part is 
dedicated for the practical implementation and technical aspects. In total the document 
includes 14 domains [4]: 
 cloud computing architectural framework 
 governance and enterprise risk management 
 legal issues: contracts and electronic discovery 
 compliance and audit management 
 information management and data security 
 interoperability and portability 
 traditional security, business continuity and disaster recovery 
 data center operations 
 incident response 
 application security 
 encryption and key management 
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 identity, entitlement and access management 
 virtualization 
 security as a service. 
CSA’s guide is primarily directed at those who plan to migrate their services to cloud. 
Many of the recommendations are not as technically detailed as CIS Critical Security 
Controls, but they are selected specifically for cloud. Consequently, the controls pre-
sented in CSA’s document have been picked and balanced with both cloud consumers 
and providers in mind. The benefit comparing to other controls is that there are no guide-
lines which would not be suitable for shared technologies. 
The guideline emphasizes how the responsibilities between cloud consumer and pro-
vider vary between cloud deployment models. In IaaS, the provider can only take care 
of the layers they offer. Therefore layers starting from the operating system upwards are 
handled by the consumer. With SaaS the provider offers the whole stack of services, so 
the responsibilities allocated for the consumer are fewer. However, the division of re-
sponsibilities is not always that simple and there are no exact predefined rules. This 
poses some additional challenges when performing risk assessments. [4] 
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4 Risk Assessment Process 
This chapter describes the theory of risk assessment. The chapter introduces the general 
framework for the risk assessment process as defined in international standard ISO/IEC 
27005:2011, and also the exact methods selected for this study. The methods were cho-
sen based on the data and tools available in the case company’s cloud environment and 
also by referring to the methods used by CSA in their report introduced in Section 2.3.1. 
There are many threat modelling techniques but STRIDE was selected for the present 
study since it was also used by CSA’s most recent report.  
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 standard is part of the ISO27k family and it is complementary to 
ISO/IEC 27001 introduced in Chapter 3. The standard includes guidelines for information 
security risk management. The activities described in the standard are risk assessment, 
risk treatment, risk acceptance, risk communication, risk monitoring and review. The risk 
assessment process of the framework was used as the basis of this study. The standard 
does not give specifics on how each step should be performed, so it is up to the organi-
zation to decide on the best way to implement them. [24] 
The following sections introduce the steps with more details, but a high level description 
of the risk assessment process is seen in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Risk assessment process [24] 
Before even entering the risk assessment process, the scope should be agreed on. De-
fining the scope means deciding what is covered, for example if the assessment is done 
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to IT infrastructure or to a single application. After that risk identification is performed in 
order to describe the risks, followed by risk analysis where the probability and impact of 
the risks are determined. Finally risk evaluation is done where priorities to the risks are 
assigned and decisions made whether action should be taken or not. These steps are 
described in more detail in the following sections. Section 4.4 goes beyond the ISO/IEC 
27005 framework by introducing the exact methods selected for the study at hand. [24] 
4.1 Risk Identification 
The first step in the risk assessment process is risk identification. This covers the identi-
fication of assets, threats, vulnerabilities, existing controls and consequences. The order 
of the actions is not dictated in the standard since it depends on the selected methodol-
ogy. How the identification is done is up to the assessor and organization. [24] 
The first item, identification of assets, means defining everything of value to the organi-
zation. The assets included do not have to be just software of hardware, but they should 
be specified within the scope agreed for the risk assessment. After the assets are listed, 
owner for each is assigned. The owner does not have to be the person who has paid for 
the asset, but someone who has responsibility for the maintenance, development and 
security of the asset. [24] 
Second task is the identification of threats. The threats can be internal or external and 
they can occur by accident or on purpose. The methodology for threat modelling is not 
defined in ISO/IEC 27005:2011, so also in this case it is up to the organization to find a 
suitable method. However, any previous risk assessments should be consulted if avail-
able. There are also different threat catalogues online that can be used as source. Sec-
tions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 introduced some strategies for finding threats. [24]  
Fourth item, identification of existing controls, includes listing all the planned and imple-
mented security controls and their statuses. Documentation and discussions with secu-
rity responsible and users can be referred to. [24] 
When vulnerabilities are being identified, the following areas are included [24]: 
 organization 
 processes and procedures 
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 management routines 
 personnel 
 physical environment 
 information system configuration 
 hardware, software or communications equipment 
 dependence on external parties. 
A vulnerability can also be the result of ineffective or neglected security control. In this 
study the security controls introduced in Chapter 3 were used as a guideline. 
Identifying the consequences is an important step in order to be able to evaluate the 
impact of the risks in the next phase of the process. The consequences can be loss of 
reputation, impacts on effectiveness or actual damage to a system. Cost is not the only 
factor, instead business effects are also considered. One consequence can affect multi-
ple assets and it can be either temporary or permanent. At this stage the consequences 
are only listed, not ranked by value. [24] 
4.2 Risk Analysis 
The second phase of the risk assessment process is risk analysis where the risks are 
measured. The risks can be scaled quantitatively, qualitatively and semi-quantitatively. 
In its most basic form risk is calculated as the product of likelihood and impact. Other 
more complicated formulas can also be used, but in order to get into any conclusion, 
values need to be known or decided. 
In quantitative risk assessment a set of rules and measurable metrics are used to deter-
mine the values related to risk. The results can be more precise than with qualitative 
method, but performing comprehensive quantitative assessment can become very ex-
hausting and require multiple tools. It typically requires historical data from previous at-
tacks or other similar statistics. The downside is that there will be no comparable data 
for newly discovered attacks, meaning the method may offer false impression of preci-
sion. Being able to make the assessment on such a level that it could be repeated, can 
become rather costly and time consuming and thus outweigh the benefits. The results 
may also be harder to interpret business-wise if the differences in values are not large. 
[5][24] 
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In qualitative assessment the scale is not numerical, but instead values such as low, 
medium or high are used to describe the risk. Since the scale is not refined, the differ-
ences between the levels are not clearly seen. This resulting problem is similar to those 
in the quantitative where the differences can be too small. With qualitative method two 
risks that are perceived as medium can actually be quite far from each other. The method 
also relies on experience instead of metrics and the results may vary depending on who 
conducts the assessment [5]. However, qualitative analysis can be used as initial as-
sessment before deciding which risks require additional investigation [24]. If the assess-
ment is made by a group of experts and people with understanding on the business 
needs, the actual assessment may reflect the risk to business more clearly. Communi-
cating the results to management can also be easier with the qualitative method. 
The third option, semi-quantitative, can be a good compromise between precision and 
cost. In this method numerical values are assigned instead of low-high scale. This 
method communicates risk better than the plain qualitative method, but it too relies on 
someone assigning the values for each factor used in the assessment. The justification 
behind each value has to be carefully documented if the assessment needs to be com-
parable in the future, or if circumstances change and that the outcome needs to be ad-
justed. [5] 
Once the scaling is decided on, it is applied to impact and probability. With impact the 
consequences of the incident are evaluated. Typically there are technical and business 
impacts, and it depends on the organization’s values, which criteria is used. The value 
of the asset is taken into consideration, but often the damage cannot be measured only 
monetarily. The impacts to reputation or lost time and work hours are also a factor, not 
to mention possible lawful consequences. The impact may have multiple values in cases 
where, for example, the workhours used for constructing the asset are not substantial, 
but the value lost if a competitor gets hold of the asset is considerable. The impact may 
also differ depending if the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the asset is compro-
mised [24]. 
The second factor analyzed is the probability, or likelihood, of the risk. During the analy-
sis current security controls, vulnerabilities and also motivation of the possible attackers 
are taken into consideration. In cases where the threat is physical, the location and ge-
ography as well as existing physical countermeasures are evaluated. [24] 
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There is a direct correlation between the likelihood of the security incident and the vul-
nerabilities of the system, but in order to be exploited, the vulnerabilities have to be dis-
covered. Consequently the skillset and motivation of the attacker becomes a factor as 
well as opportunities available. That involves understanding whether special access or 
knowledge is required in order for the exploit to succeed. There are for example attacks 
that require physical access to the equipment or premises. Furthermore, certain vulner-
abilities are easier to discover than others and therefore pose a greater risk. [6] 
However, as opposed to technical vulnerabilities, lapses in operational procedures do 
not even have to be discovered by anyone in advance in order to cause damage. A 
certain event that normally would not be detrimental for the system can have unexpected 
consequences even without a malicious intention. For example, an accidental deletion 
of data from a database, could cause severe damage if backup procedures of the system 
would not be in place. 
Lastly, once the impact and probability are decided on, the risk level is determined. Dif-
ferent kind of matrixes can be formed between impact and probability, or mathematical 
formulas used to calculate the risk. The result from the task is a list of risks with a value 
assigned to them [24]. The risk rating is often considered as more of a priority list than 
that of absolute value. The main purpose is to understand the importance and ranking of 
different risks. 
4.3 Risk Evaluation 
After the risk list with values assigned is formed, it is time to evaluate the risks. This step 
is normally done by the organization and not by the assessor, but it is included here since 
it is part of the risk assessment process. Evaluation means deciding which actions, if 
any, should be taken to mitigate the risks. 
Factors to be considered include the importance of the asset or process that is affected 
by the risk and also whether the confidentiality, availability of integrity of the target is 
important to the organization. There may be legal aspects that affect the decisions as 
well. [24] 
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4.4 Selected Methods 
As mentioned in the previous section, ISO/IEC 27005:2011 standard does not dictate 
how threats should be identified. There is no right or wrong way of approaching the task, 
but there are different strategies. Threat modelling can be run from an asset, attacker or 
software centric starting point. 
In asset centric threat modelling everything starts by listing the things the company con-
siders as an asset. Asset is something of value to the company, for example information 
or system, but it can also be something attackers see worth stealing. In order for the risk 
to be realized, the asset actually has to be both. If the information has no value for any-
one apart the company, there should not be any reason to go after it. [8] 
In this modelling, the threats can be found by understanding ways the assets could be 
compromised. Consequently, it is vital to have a complete list of the assets, and including 
only physical items is not enough. Since the assets are often information, understanding 
the business needs and values can prove important [5]. The downside of focusing on 
assets is that it can be difficult to make a full list of the assets without understanding the 
whole system. The analysis can end up focusing only on the things the company sees 
value in and ignore assets that others may value, thus miss part of the threats.  
The second option, attacker centric approach, starts from attackers. This method focuses 
on who would want to compromise the system and why. The attacker approach can be 
problematic to implement, since it requires understanding the motivations behind the at-
tack. It can be difficult to make comprehensive list of who might want to negatively impact 
the system. Therefore this approach is usually not the best starting point [8]. 
The third option is software centric modelling, where the application is dissected into 
components and logical data flows drawn between them. Trust boundaries between dif-
ferent areas are drawn and attacks surfaces are better understood. This method requires 
knowing the software on a level that developers do, but it can give a good overview of 
the things that may be threatened [8]. In comparison to the asset centric starting point, 
software centric modelling may actually reveal assets that would have been left out when 
only covering assets by means of value. 
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When cloud environments are considered, each analytical approach has its benefits. 
Software centric may seem like the best option on many cases, but in IaaS there are 
parts that the cloud provider’s own developers may not fully grasp. System usually relies 
on third party components like the hypervisor and the cloud operating system, which can 
be difficult to fully model. However, when evaluating a cloud, the assets may not be clear 
as most of the value comes from the usability and not necessarily from the information 
itself. Attacker centric starting point on the other hand was excluded since the attacker 
pool for cloud would have been too large to effectively cover. 
Consequently, the approach selected for the present study was software centric. MI-
TRE’s CAPEC attack library was studied in order to determine if it would be suitable for 
finding the threats, but the library was found to be too extensive. It also lacks cloud-
specific information, so selecting the correct attacks would have required a longer expe-
rience in threat modelling. Therefore, the main threat modelling was decided to be 
STRIDE, which is also used with software centric modelling. Furthermore, STRIDE was 
included in the most recent study by Cloud Security Alliance regarding top cloud risks 
[5]. Even though STRIDE is not designed with cloud environments in mind, other similar 
studies on cloud have used it [25]. 
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5 Conducting Risk Assessment 
This chapter describes how the risk assessment was conducted in the present study. 
The method for measuring risk in the study was decided to be qualitative. There was not 
enough data available for making a quantitative analysis, since this was a proof of con-
cept system. The system had not been running before and there was not enough metrics 
to measure. Vulnerability scans were available but those were the closest to any repeat-
able measurement available. Furthermore, the scans only covered certain components 
of the system. The tools that could have been used for this purpose were also limited. 
Since this assessment was the first one done to the system, it made sense to make the 
initial assessment as qualitative. Consecutive risk assessments could then be performed 
in order to have a closer look at the more serious risks. These assessments could be 
done as quantitative if possible at that stage. 
The actual risk assessment process was divided into five parts. Figure 6 describes the 
process on a high level. 
 
Figure 6. High level plan of the risk assessment 
In the preparation phase the methods for the risk assessment were decided. Two work-
shops were held with the customer in order to cover all the risks and later to rate them. 
In the final phase risk assessment report was delivered to the customer. All these phases 
will be discussed in more details in the following sections. 
5.1 Preparation Phase 
The goal of the preparation phase was to collect material for the first workshop. Figure 7 
shows the tasks in preparation phase. 
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Figure 7. Tasks in preparation phase 
The first step was the selection of the analytical approach. As explained in Section 4.4, 
software centric approach with STRIDE was chosen. After discussing with the cloud pro-
vider it was confirmed that that the concept of an asset in this case was too difficult to 
define explicitly. In addition, starting from the attacker base was seen as a limiting view-
point, since the PoC system was only available to the company at this phase. Choosing 
that approach could also make the assessment less feasible considering lessons learned 
for the production environment. 
The second task included consulting the cloud developers in order to get a list of the 
components used in the system. For example, the software, used to control the creation 
of the cloud projects and users, was studied in order to understand the system. All other 
third party product (3PP) components were also listed. Based on the list, the known 
weaknesses of the software involved were looked at in the third step. Even though MI-
TRE’s CAPEC attack library was found to be unpractical in this case, their Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) list provided important information on the vulnera-
bilities of different components. In addition, the web pages related to each function or 
component were consulted. 
During the fourth task, recommended security controls from CIS “Recommendations for 
Critical Security Controls” [23] and each 3PP software provider were checked. ISO/IEC 
27002 standard and CSA’s “Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Com-
puting” were also consulted for best practices. Supporting questions for the first work-
shop were selected from these recommendations. Only those that were applicable to the 
cloud system were listed, but many of the best practices could also be applied to tradi-
tional information systems. For example, questions such as “Are the backups stored on 
a separate location?” or “Is the data encrypted during transfer to the cloud?” were 
formed. 
The purpose of the questions was to guide the workshop to find any possible threats or 
vulnerabilities in the system, in case dissecting the cloud system and finding threats 
39 
  
based on that would not provide enough information. By referring to the questions, de-
velopers could look at different components associated with each function and locate the 
possible problems. The main idea was still to approach the system via STRIDE method 
and use the questionnaire as a backup.  
5.2 Workshop for Identifying Risks 
The goal of the first workshop was to find threats, vulnerabilities and risks related to the 
system. First the scope was checked in order to confirm what use cases and features 
should be included and what excluded. Certain functions of the cloud were still in the 
design phase, and those were directly left out. In the end the scope was limited to the 
basic functions of IaaS.  
Different assets were also defined, but as discovered already in the preparation phase, 
listing all assets was difficult. Having for example a web server with information data-
bases and a user interface for the customer, would have been more straightforward. In 
this case the physical machines, networking components, databases and other compo-
nents were numerous, not to mention the challenges that rise from using shared tech-
nologies. Drawing the line between cloud provider and consumer responsibilities was 
also difficult. Some of the assets first discovered were actually considered to be the con-
sumer’s assets when it comes to handling risks, since the provider can influence only on 
the levels they offer. 
An additional problem was the functions that were not yet complete. Some of those used 
assets that were dedicated for those functions had to be excluded from this assessment, 
since the use cases were not clear. 
After the scope had been defined, the idea of STRIDE was introduced to the developers. 
Examples of threats related to spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, 
denial of service and elevation of privilege were given to direct the workshop into looking 
the system from multiple angles. 
After the introduction, the developers were asked to draw open the cloud system but it 
became apparent that visualizing the 3PP parts completely was a challenging tasks. The 
parts that were developed inside the company and those that were frequently used were 
easy to understand, but the less used components were left out. Seeing that the cloud 
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was too complicated and large to be effectively analyzed as a complete system, the 
questionnaire formed in the preparation phase was taken into use instead.  
By following the questionnaire about security controls and requirements a list of the de-
viations was formed. The supporting list of questions actually revealed components that 
were not described in the initial attempt of breaking up the cloud into parts. The ques-
tionnaire also sprung discussion outside its scope, providing important information. 
The deviations from the controls along with other findings from the discussions were 
written down, and organized after the workshop. Most of the issues discovered were 
considered to be vulnerabilities. Multiple threats were also found as well as a couple of 
issues that could be rated directly as risks. 
5.3 Forming the Risk Listing 
The next phase after the workshop was translating the findings into risks. The case com-
pany was not involved in this task. A threat or vulnerability as such does not directly 
mean a single risk. Many of the vulnerabilities, and in some cases also threats, contrib-
uted to multiple different risks. On the other hand, many of them could be grouped under 
the same risk. As an example, one of the highest risks rated by the previous research in 
cloud security was shared technology vulnerabilities. If issues with certain software’s 
patch management and cloud tenant separation would have been discovered, both of 
those would contribute to the shared technology risk. Patch management issues would 
in addition contribute to the risks related to system vulnerabilities and possibly on the 
insecure APIs as well. 
The final risk listing resulted in for about half of the total issues identified in the workshop. 
The risks had to be expressed in a level above the threat or vulnerability as there is a 
difference between those three as discussed in Section 2.2.  
Half of the risks discovered could be matched with the risks found from the composite 
risk listing introduced in Section 2.3.5. The result was expected as the reports included 
multiple similar findings despite having different sources. If considering the risks from 
confidentiality, integrity and availability perspectives, all of those aspects were approxi-
mately equally represented. Many of the risks were considered to be operational rather 
than purely technical. 
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5.4 Workshop for Evaluating Risk 
After determining the risks based on the vulnerabilities and threats, a second workshop 
was held with the case company. In this workshop the business impact and probability 
of the risks were evaluated together with the developers and system administrators. The 
case company’s input was required since only they have full knowledge about the busi-
ness impact of each risk. It is viable to suggest rating for the probability based on the 
findings from the first workshop, but in order to understand the actual impact, in-depth 
knowledge on the business is needed. On both aspects the opinion of the case company 
was still considered to be highly influential. 
The scale used in the evaluation was negligible, low, medium and high for both proba-
bility and impact.  
For probability the values were defined as: 
 Negligible: May occur, but only under exceptional circumstances. 
 Low: Could occur sometimes. 
 Medium: Likely to occur. 
 High: Expected to happen. 
For impact the values were: 
 Negligible: Very low or no impact on the business. 
 Low: Rather low impact on the business. Business objectives can still be 
achieved but more resources and/or measures may be needed. 
 Medium: Clear impact on the business. It is very difficult to achieve the business 
objectives even with additional resources. 
 High: Significant impact on the business. It is uncertain that the business can 
continue. 
In this study the system under evaluation was a proof of concept environment, so the 
business in this case meant the operation of the system. The team evaluated whether 
the cloud PoC could be used for the purpose it was built. 
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During the workshop there were three risks that were decided to be left out of the rating. 
The reason was that the features they concerned were still under development. Those 
risks would have to be rated after the implementation was closer to being completed. 
After determining the impact and probability, the risk rating was calculated based on the 
risk matrix shown in Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8. Risk rating matrix 
The risk levels were divided into informational, low, medium and high. If the impact of 
the threat was high, the risk level was always high regardless of the probability. This 
reflects the importance of the risk assessment for the business function. If the probability 
of the threat was high, the risk was also high unless the impacts were negligible. The 
risks where the total rating was high were considered unacceptable and the rest accepta-
ble. Unacceptable in this case means that actions should be taken immediately. 
The risk levels with required action plans were as follows: 
 Informational: Minor risk or observation. Should be followed in long term 
 Low: Limited risk. Should be followed and actions considered in long term 
 Medium: Poses a risk to operations and requires actions also short term 
 High: Serious risk to operations. Requires immediate action 
 
5.5 Risk Assessment Report 
After the risks had been ranked according to severity, a report was written to the cus-
tomer. The report included description of each risk and its probability and impact. The 
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related threats, vulnerabilities and existing controls were also listed along with the rec-
ommendations. 
Before delivering the report to the customer, the risk ratings were also revised by senior 
security consultants in the company. Some of the risks were adjusted compared to the 
initial workshop with the customer. All of the risk levels that were altered were raised to 
a higher risk level. The difference was mostly caused by the different viewpoint on PoC 
system. Customer’s original rating was based on the fact that the target was not a pro-
duction system, but the security consultants wanted the risk levels to give better feed-
back for the upcoming production environment.  
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6 Discussion 
In this chapter the results of the study are discussed. The goal of this thesis was to 
investigate how risk assessment is conducted and also evaluate the suitability of the 
selected methods for cloud environment. The exact findings of the risk assessment were 
not the main focus, instead it was the procedure of making the assessment for a cloud 
environment. 
In general, performing a qualitative risk assessment is not an exact science. It is affected 
by the competence and experience of the assessor. The product team providing input 
for the risks assessment is also a vital part of a successful evaluation. The larger the 
system, the harder it is to effectively cover everything. If the target is an application or a 
single server, it may be easier to assess the system with purely technical methods. Vul-
nerability scans and penetration testing as well as historical data on previous attacks, or 
at least security monitoring, would have been helpful in making the results repeatable 
and more reliable. Since the cloud system was still being developed those were not 
available at this time. For this study, the method of relying on workshop data as well as 
system component best practices was the correct choice. 
The original plan of using STRIDE threat modelling as the basis of the workshop was not 
optimal. STRIDE would have suited better for assessing an application or maybe a 
smaller system. Using STRIDE for the whole cloud infrastructure proved to be difficult 
and most of the input was received by going through the questionnaire related to the 
recommendations by CSA, SANS Institute and ISO/IEC 27002. In all, the problem was 
not with the selected threat model, but limitations of modelling in general. Trying to split 
the cloud system into manageable pieces for the workshop was not practical. Ground-
work could have been made this way, but for the discussions it was not the best choice. 
More emphasis could have been placed into building the questionnaire had this been 
known. In this study the questionnaire was meant as supporting material instead of a 
foundation.  
However, having a workshop for discovering risks was found useful. Relevant infor-
mation was discovered during the workshop and the team responded openly to questions 
concerning the recommended best practices and controls. It could be argued whether 
the same questionnaire could have been delivered on paper or electronically without 
face-to-face discussion, but the information collected during the workshop exceeded the 
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scope of the questions. Having multiple people looking at the recommendations and 
thinking of deviations produced more value than one person answering the questions 
alone. For many of the topics the initial answer from one person started a discussion that 
led to a result that was different from what was originally thought. The probable reason 
for that is that a single person rarely holds a full understanding of the system. 
One thing to consider when having a workshop for discovering risks is who should par-
ticipate. In this assessment all the participants were technical personnel, including the 
project responsible. Some of the topics related to operational procedures could have 
benefited from having higher management present. However, that could have affected 
how openly the rest of the team responds to questions and the dynamics of the discus-
sion. A good solution would have been having people from development, administration 
and operational sides, preferably ones that are closely involved in the daily operation of 
the system. In the internal PoC phase, these departments were not yet formed, so the 
participants were limited. 
When it comes to the workshop for rating risks, it could have been valuable to include 
people from the managerial side. The business impacts would have been best rated by 
those that have an overall understanding of the economics. However, in this phase the 
business value could not be measured with costs or profits, instead only functionality of 
the system could be evaluated.  
In the rating workshop the competence of the assessor is essential. With more experi-
ence, the assessor is able to effectively question the probabilities and impacts suggested 
in the product team. Especially probability can be justified with technical knowledge and 
previous experiences from other systems. In this study the initial rating relied too heavily 
on input from the workshop team. An assessor with a longer experience in risk assess-
ments would have been able to contribute more to the workshop. 
The actual findings of the risk assessment were not the main focus here, however the 
results are discussed on a general level in order to understand how the selected methods 
may have affected the outcome. Figure 9 shows how the risk severities were divided.  
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Figure 9. Number of risks by severity 
The values were removed from the y-axis due to confidentiality reasons, but the chart 
gives as overview of the risks discovered. The rating shows the results after the severi-
ties were revised by senior security consultants.  
75% of the high and medium risks discovered were more operational than technical. It 
can be assumed that this was affected by the method used in the workshop. The ques-
tionnaire related to best practices included more recommendations on the operational 
than technical level. Therefore it is logical that the risks discovered reflect that. Further-
more, since the assessment was done in the PoC phase and the rating adjusted to cor-
relate with severities of a production environment, it is expected that the findings include 
more high ranked risks related to operational procedures than what would be discovered 
in the production phase. The reasoning is that in the PoC phase the system and opera-
tions around it are not fully matured. There are certain processes that are only imple-
mented as going to production. 
Another factor affecting the results is the lack of complete vulnerability analysis of the 
components used in the system. Even though MITRE’s CVE database and vendor web 
pages were consulted, it does not equal to a full vulnerability analysis. Therefore some 
of the technical threats were most likely not discovered or at least their probability not 
evaluated to full extent. 
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Finally, the stage where the assessment was done should be discussed. Making the risk 
assessment during internal PoC phase had its benefits and disadvantages. Not all the 
features were fully implemented and some were still in the design phase. The evaluation 
at this stage cannot be said to be comprehensive, but the assessment gave valuable 
feedback on how to improve the cloud environment before going to production. Even 
large changes to the system were still possible when the risk assessment was done this 
early. The basic functions of the cloud environment were in place and improvements on 
them could be made with moderate effort compared to having to rethink designs close 
to launch. Consequently, making the assessment in the internal PoC phase was valua-
ble, but new assessment should be made as more features are completed. 
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7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter goes through the conclusions from the study and also presents recommen-
dations for future risk assessments. The different methods for finding threats are com-
pared and improvement plan for the next risk assessment is introduced. 
7.1 Conclusions on Threat Modelling 
Three main sources were used for when finding threats. This section compares those 
methods. STRIDE, CAPEC attack library and a checklist of recommendations on security 
controls were examined during this study. The last one is not strictly speaking a threat 
modelling method, but it was used to discover threats, vulnerabilities and risks in this 
assessment. The comparison between the methodologies is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Comparison of methods 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
STRIDE 
Can discover emergent, 
non-defined threats 
Requires good description on  
functions and flows in the sys-
tem 
Very flexible High level model 
Does not constrain  
Excellent for small/well-
defined applications 
 
CAPEC 
Very detailed Hard to get into 
Extensive list Time consuming 
Real world attacks, not 
theoretical 
Restricts creativity 
 Requires good understanding 
of the system 
 May not discover emergent 
issues 
 
Security control checklists 
 
Good for large systems Dependant on discussion 
Real world experiences 
as basis, not just theory 
May not discover emergent 
issues 
Suitable for beginner Not a proper threat model 
It should be noted that the advantages and disadvantages in Table 6 may change de-
pending on the system and experience of the person doing the modelling. For cloud 
environment, where the environment is very complicated and drawing open the data 
flows and functions was difficult, STRIDE suffered the most. The benefits of STRIDE are 
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undeniable and it allows discovering new threats better than the other methods. If the 
assessment was not done to IaaS system and all the functions were listed meticulously, 
STRIDE would have been the best method. It does not limit threats to those already 
known and allows for great flexibility. Like checklists, STRIDE could also be considered 
to be dependent on discussion with the developers, but experienced modeler would 
probably still get comprehensive list even from less discussion. If modeling a more con-
strained system like a database or a web server, STRIDE would be the recommended 
method. 
Unlike STRIDE, CAPEC attack library focuses on attacks instead of security properties, 
so comparing those two directly is not straightforward. CAPEC library was extremely 
detailed, but the amount of attacks listed was overwhelming for a person who has not 
done threat modelling before. If done by one person, going through the whole library 
would have taken unreasonably long. Since the system was a cloud environment with 
partly unclear use cases, CAPEC was also difficult to apply. Finding relevant threats from 
CAPEC requires good technical understanding of the functions involved. For more ex-
perienced assessor, the library may also act as a constraint and not encourage to think 
outside the norm. Similarly to STRIDE, CAPEC could be efficient when examining a sys-
tem with clearer limits. For such system, combining STRIDE with CAPEC would probably 
be a good idea assuming the modeler is already familiar with some of the attacks in 
CAPEC and the time invested in using it would be justified. 
The third option, security control checklists from standards and other recommendations, 
proved to be the best option when assessing IaaS cloud. As mentioned earlier, the dis-
cussions with developers were extremely valuable and resulted in discovering multiple 
threats. Since the discussion relied on controls for existing attacks, it is likely that new 
attacks would not be found by using the checklists. However, considering the information 
available from the system and the experience of the assessor, the method was suitable. 
The biggest downside is that the risks discovered would have been a lot less if the dis-
cussions were not so open.  
Had it been possible to define the use cases as simple functions and draw those open, 
STRIDE could have been used for those while the IaaS infrastructure was evaluated with 
the help of the check lists.  
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7.2 Recommendations for Future Risk Assessments 
Risk management is a continuous process and therefore risk assessments should also 
be regularly updated. As new features are being implemented, the system should be re-
assessed. The same applies if the system will go to production.  
If going to production, it would be recommended to collect additional data from vulnera-
bility scans, penetration testing and security monitoring of the system. As a result there 
would be more reliable data for the risk assessment which would not be as dependent 
on the assessor or the team taking part in the assessment. During vulnerability analysis 
the system is examined with technical methods in order to discover weaknesses. Pene-
tration testing on the other hand takes it one step further and tries to exploit the weak-
nesses and gain access to the system. Penetration testing is therefore more intrusive 
than vulnerability analysis and requires different kind of expertise. Often this is performed 
by ethical hackers. Both of these actions are separated from the actual risk assessment 
and should be done prior to starting the assessment.  
Based on experiences from this study, an improved plan for the risk assessment is 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Improved plan for risk assessment 
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As displayed in Figure 10, it would be recommended to gather data from vulnerability 
analysis of selected components before going into the risk assessment. As discovered 
during this study, splitting the whole system into components may not be feasible with a 
large cloud system, but there are certain functions that are more clearly separated and 
could be analyzed individually outside the assessment. For example user portal, identity 
management, storage API and cloud management API are such functions.  
After the data is collected from the vulnerability analysis, the selected components could 
be examined via STRIDE threat model. This can be done as a workshop with the devel-
opers assuming the functions are built in-house. Optionally, the findings of the vulnera-
bility analysis can be directly included in the risk listing. 
As for the complete system, the method of using a questionnaire with best practices in a 
workshop was found effective in this study. The same approach could be complemented 
with penetration testing of the system and data collected from security monitoring and 
vulnerability scans. Information from all of these sources could then be included in the 
risk listing. 
Finally a workshop for rating the risks can be held. By combining the different data 
sources, the listing would not rely as heavily on the assessor. The rating should still be 
discussed with the cloud provider, since they do have the best understanding of the 
business functions. However, it would be best if the assessor is able to do a preliminary 
rating which would give a starting point for the discussions. 
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ENISA - Cloud computing risks 
Policy and organizational risks: 
 R.1: Lock-in 
 R.2: Loss of governance 
 R.3: Compliance challenges 
 R.4: Loss of business reputation due to co-tenant activities 
 R.5: Cloud service termination or failure 
 R.6: Cloud provider acquisition 
 R.7: Supply chain failure 
 
Technical risks: 
 
 R.8: Resource exhaustion (under or over provisioning) 
 R.9: Isolation failure 
 R.10: Cloud provider malicious insider – abuse of high privilege roles 
 R.11: Management interface compromise (manipulation, availability of infrastruc-
ture) 
 R.12: Intercepting data in transit 
 R.13: Data-leakage on up/download, intra-cloud 
 R.14: Insecure of ineffective deletion of data 
 R.15: Distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
 R.16: Economic denial of service (EDoS) 
 R.17: Loss of encryption keys 
 R.18: Undertaking malicious scans or probes 
 R.19: Compromise service engine 
 R.20: Conflicts between customer hardening procedures and cloud environment 
 
Legal risks: 
 
 R.21: Subpoena and e-discovery 
 R.22: Risks from changes of jurisdiction 
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 R.23: Data protection risks 
 R.24: Licensing risks 
 
Risks not specific to cloud: 
 
 R.25: Network breaks 
 R.26: Network management (ie. network congestion, mis-connection, non-opti-
mal use) 
 R.27:Modifying network traffic 
 R.28: Privilege escalation 
 R.29: Social engineering attacks (ie. impersonation) 
 R.30: Loss or compromise of operational logs 
 R.31: Loss or compromise of security logs (manipulation of forensics investiga-
tion) 
 R.32: Backups lost, stolen 
 R.33: Unauthorized access to premises(including physical access to machines 
and other facilities) 
 R.34: Theft of computer equipment 
 R.35: Natural disasters  
